We used a multi-dimensional framework to assess current stereotypes of men and women. Specifically, we sought to determine (1) how men and women are characterized by male and female raters, (2) how men and women characterize themselves, and (3) the degree of convergence between self-characterizations and charcterizations of one’s gender group. In an experimental study, 628 U.S. male and female raters described men, women, or themselves on scales representing multiple dimensions of the two defining features of gender stereotypes, agency and (...) communality: assertiveness, independence, instrumental competence, leadership competence (agency dimensions), and concern for others, sociability and emotional sensitivity (communality dimensions). Results indicated that stereotypes about communality persist and were equally prevalent for male and female raters, but agency characterizations were more complex. Male raters generally descibed women as being less agentic than men and as less agentic than female raters described them. However, female raters differentiated among agency dimensions and described women as less assertive than men but as equally independent and leadership competent. Gender stereotypes also were evident in self-ratings, with female raters rating themselves as less agentic than male raters and male raters rating themselves as less communal than female raters, although there were exceptions (e.g., no differences in independence and sociability self-ratings for men and women). Comparisons of self-ratings and ratings of men and women in general indicated that women tended to characterize themselves in more stereotypic terms – as less assertive and less competent in leadership – than they characterized others in their gender group. Men, in contrast, characterized themselves in less stereotypic terms – as more communal. Overall, our results show that a focus on facets of agency and communality can provide deeper insights about stereotype content than a focus on overall agency and communality. (shrink)

This article argues that social networks constitute an inauthentic form of sociality. The two component concepts of this claim, inauthenticity and sociality, are explored in order to avoid some widespread misinterpretations. Inauthenticity is examined on the basis of the relevant sections in Heidegger’s 'Being and Time', first with respect to its main characteristics, then in terms of what motivates it and its benefits, and finally with respect to its status as a non-normative concept. The second part of the paper explores (...) sociality. Here, a main emphasis is the way in which my body imposes constraints on my social relations in the here and now, which virtuality appears to overcome. Yet such an escape from corporeality is not ultimately possible. The third and final part takes the analysis to the wider level of world, that is, our current historical world which has given rise to such an understanding of sociality. (shrink)

In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their “veritistic value”, i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because we often don't know what beliefs are actually true, and even if we did, (...) the task of determining the veritistic value would be computationally extremely difficult. Neither problem is specific to Goldman's theory and both can be expected to arise for just about any account of veritistic value. It is argued here that the first problem does not pose a serious threat to large classes of interesting practices. The bulk of the paper is devoted to the computational problem, which, it is submitted, can be addressed in promising terms by means of computer simulation. In an attempt to add vividness to this proposal, an up-and-running simulation environment is presented and put to some preliminary tests. (shrink)

Book Review of Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann *Bayesian Epistemology* by Erik J. Olsson.

Eating disorders (EDs) are characterized by marked cognitive distortions and maladaptive schemas. Cognitive models of EDs highlight the direct impact of cognitive dysfunctions on eating-related disturbances, insofar as specific cognitive contents such as thoughts about diet rules and food or loss of control may trigger disturbed eating behavior. Moreover, early maladaptive schemas that reflect perfectionist standards and relate to achievement and performance seem to be associated with disturbed eating, e.g. via their impact on situation-specific appraisals. However, so far, no study (...) has investigated these assumptions. Hence, the present study sought to demonstrate whether and how cognitive content exerts an impact on eating behavior in daily life, and whether maladaptive core schemas impact the occurrence of binge eating via dysfunctional ED cognitions in eating-related contexts. N = 29 females with Bulimia Nervosa (BN), n = 31 females with Binge Eating Disorder (BED) and n = 30 female controls without EDs (NC) participated in the study. All participants received a handheld computer for a 48-hour period to capture antecedents of disturbed eating behavior in daily life. Event-sampling (meals, binge eating, purging, stressful situations) and signal-sampling (five times a day) methods were applied. EMA included a short questionnaire to assess dysfunctional cognitions and level of craving and to capture information about situational contexts. Early maladaptive schemas were assessed using a short version of the Young Schema Questionnaire at baseline. The main results showed specific patterns of dysfunctional eating-related cognitions for BED and BN. Binge eating was predicted by thoughts about loss of control (positively) and dietary restraint (negatively). For meal situations, no significant differences between the two ED groups emerged. All three domains exerted indirect effects on craving via thoughts about ‘eating/loss of control’, whereas neither a direct nor an indirect effect emerged regarding thoughts about ‘dietary restraint’. These results fit well with previous studies and support cognitive models of EDs; schema therapeutic approaches may be a valuable contribution to enhance treatment of EDs. Further studies should explore whether the findings from emerging adulthood can be generalized to younger age groups. (shrink)

This open access book provides the first explicit case study for an application of the method of reflective equilibrium (RE), using it to develop and defend a precautionary principle. It thereby makes an important and original contribution to questions of philosophical method and methodology. The book shows step-by-step how RE is applied, and develops a methodological framework which will be useful for everyone who wishes to use reflective equilibrium. With respect to precautionary principles, the book demonstrates how a rights-based precautionary (...) principle can be constructed and defended. The case study succeeds in demonstrating that RE can be successfully applied and puts real constraints on the justification process. This is all the more remarkable as the case study was designed as an open-ended process, without presupposing any specific results. This book will be highly relevant both to people interested in philosophical methodology and epistemology, as well as to researchers who are interested in using philosophical methods and tools and applying them to practical problems. (shrink)

The basic idea underlying a precautionary principle is often summarized as “better safe than sorry.” Even if it is uncertain whether an activity will lead to harm, for example, to the environment or to human health, measures should be taken to prevent harm. This demand is partly motivated by the consequences of regulatory practices of the past. Often, chances of harm were disregarded because there was no scientific proof of a causal connection between an activity or substance and chances of (...) harm, for example, between asbestos and lung diseases. When this connection was finally established, it was often too late to prevent severe damage. However, it is highly controversial how the vague intuition behind “better safe than sorry” should be understood as a principle. As a consequence, we find a multitude of interpretations ranging from decision rules over epistemic principles to procedural frameworks. To acknowledge this diversity, it makes sense to speak of precautionary principles (PPs) in the plural. PPs are not without critices. For example, it has been argued that they are paralyzing, unscientific, or promote a culture of irrational fear. This article systematizes the different interpretations of PPs according to their functions, gives an overview about the main lines of argument in favor of PPs, and outlines the most frequent and important objections made to them. (shrink)

This paper explores how consumers’ ethical food consumption practices, mediated by mobile phone applications (apps), are transformed into digital data. Based on a review of studies on the digitalization of ethical consumption practices and food apps, we find that previous research, while valuable, fails to acknowledge and critically examine the digital labor required to perform digitalized ethical food consumption. In this paper, we call for research on how digital labor underlies the digitalization of ethical food consumption and develop a conceptual (...) framework that supports this research agenda. Our proposed conceptual framework builds on three interconnected analytical concepts—datafication, affordances and digital labor—that enable the study of digital labor as an infrastructural element of digitalized food consumption. We illustrate our conceptual framework through our previous research concerning Buycott, a US-based mobile app whose stated aim is to facilitate consumers’ ethical purchasing decisions. Using the walkthrough method, we consider how the Buycott app engages user-generated data and what implications this holds for consumers. The app’s infrastructure, we suggest, connects ethical consumption and digital labor. A richer understanding of the digital food economy, we propose, enables social scientists not only to elucidate how consumers engage in digital labor, but also to contribute to the development of new data governance structures in the digital food economy. We therefore call for social scientists interested in food, consumption and the digital economy to contribute to a new research agenda for studying everyday food digitalization by empirically examining how ethical consumption apps implicate ethical consumers’ work. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel proof of the conservativity of the intuitionistic theory of strictly positive fixpoints, $$\widehat{{\textrm{ID}}}{}_{1}^{{\textrm{i}}}{}$$ ID ^ 1 i, over Heyting arithmetic ($${\textrm{HA}}$$ HA ), originally proved in full generality by Arai (Ann Pure Appl Log 162:807–815, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2011.03.002). The proof embeds $$\widehat{{\textrm{ID}}}{}_{1}^{{\textrm{i}}}{}$$ ID ^ 1 i into the corresponding theory over Beeson’s logic of partial terms and then uses two consecutive interpretations, a realizability interpretation of this theory into the subtheory generated by almost negative fixpoints, and (...) a direct interpretation into Heyting arithmetic with partial terms using a hierarchy of satisfaction predicates for almost negative formulae. It concludes by applying van den Berg and van Slooten’s result (Indag Math 29:260–275, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indag.2017.07.009) that Heyting arithmetic with partial terms plus the schema of self realizability for arithmetic formulae is conservative over $${\textrm{HA}}$$ HA. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing public discourse regarding the influence AI will have on the future of work. Simultaneously, considerable critical attention has been given to the implications of AI on gender equality. Far from making precise predictions about the future, this discourse demonstrates that new technologies are instances for renegotiating the relation of gender and work. This paper examines how gender is addressed in news media discourse on AI and the future of work, focusing on Germany. (...) We approach this question from a perspective of feminist technology studies and discourse analysis, exploring a corpus of 178 articles from 2015 to 2021 from German newspapers and newsmagazines. The findings indicate that critical AI and gender knowledge circulates in public discourse in the form of specific discursive frames, thematizing algorithmic bias, automatization and enhancement, and gender stereotypes. As a result, we show that, first, the discourse takes up feminist and scholarly discourse on gender and discusses AI in a way that is informed by social constructivism and standpoint theories. Second, gender appears as a—to some extent intersectional—diversity category which is critical to AI, while at the same time omitting important perspectives. Third, it can be shown that there is a renegotiating of the ideal worker norm taking place, and finally, we argue that the gendered frame of the powerful men developer responsible for AI’s risk is a concept to be challenged. (shrink)

This paper describes ongoing work towards a rich analysis of the social contexts of neologism use in historical corpora, in particular the Corpora of Early English Correspondence, with research questions concerning the innovators, meanings and diffusion of neologisms. To enable this kind of study, we are developing new processes, tools and ways of combining data from different sources, including the Oxford English Dictionary, the Historical Thesaurus, and contemporary published texts. Comparing neologism candidates across these sources is complicated by the large (...) amount of spelling variation. To make the issues tractable, we start from case studies of individual suffixes and people. By developing tools aiding these studies, we build toward more general analyses. Our aim is to develop an open-source environment where information on neologism candidates is gathered from a variety of algorithms and sources, pooled, and presented to a human evaluator for verification and exploration. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der aktuellen ethischen Debatte über die ärztliche Unterstützung bei der Selbsttötung von schwerkranken Patienten werden von unterschiedlicher Seite strafrechtliche Verbote gefordert. Ging es zunächst in der politischen Debatte ausschließlich um das Verbot organisierter Formen der Beihilfe zur Selbsttötung, werden nunmehr einerseits auch weitergehende strafrechtliche Verbote bis hin zum Verbot jeder Form von Beihilfehandlungen wie andererseits die ausdrückliche Zulassung der Suizidbeihilfe durch Ärzte gefordert. Ausgehend vom Ansatz, ein Verbot der Suizidassistenz im Strafgesetzbuch aufzunehmen, zeigt der Artikel, dass die Straflosigkeit von (...) Suizid und Suizidassistenz in Deutschland auf eine lange Tradition zurückgeht. Die Straflosigkeit der Beihilfe zum Suizid lässt sich dabei nicht nur systematisch, sondern auch inhaltlich begründen. Eine Strafbarkeit hingegen wäre weder rechtlich noch ethisch überzeugend darzustellen. Die Verfasser sprechen sich unter Bezugnahme auf einzelne Regelungsvorschläge gegen ein Strafverbot und schließlich für einen offenen Diskurs innerhalb der Ärzteschaft sowie für eine Neuregelung im Berufsrecht aus. (shrink)

Tanja Klemm legt in dieser kunsthistorischen Studie ihr Augenmerkauf das Verhältnis von Bild, Wahrnehmung und Betrachterkörpern im Spätmittelalter und in der Renaissance. Medizin, Naturphilosophie, Theologie und Bildtheorie dieser Zeit nimmt sie unter der Perspektive einer historischen Phänomenologie der Verkörperung in den Blick: Sinnliche Wahrnehmung versteht sich vor dem Hintergrund zeitgenössischer Theorien vom lebendigen Körper (corpus animatum) in einem ganzkörperlichen Sinn; Wahrnehmung - in den Worten der Zeit perceptio bzw. conceptio - erfolgt als gesamtorganismischer Vorgang. In einem ersten Teil der (...) Studie liegt der Fokus auf der Lebendigkeit und Sinnlichkeit des corpus animatum aus medizinischer, theologischer und bildtheoretischer Sicht. Daraus entwickelt die Autorin eine Theorie des Bildes und der verkörperten Wahrnehmung, die bisher innerhalb der Renaissanceforschung nicht im Mittelpunkt des bild- und wahrnehmungsgeschichtlichen Interesses stand. In einem zweiten Teil exemplifiziert sie diese Theorie anhand von kunsthistorischen Studien zu Leonardo da Vinci, Albrecht Dürer und Martin Schongauer. (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium —the idea that we have to justify our judgments and principles through a process of mutual adjustment—is taken to be a central method in philosophy. Nonetheless, conceptions of RE often stay sketchy, and there is a striking lack of explicit and traceable applications of it. This paper presents an explicit case study for the application of an elaborate RE conception. RE is used to reconstruct the arguments from Thomson’s paper “Turning the Trolley” for why a bystander must not (...) divert a runaway trolley from five workmen onto one. Analyzing Thomson’s resulting position with the RE-criteria has two main results: Firstly, the adjustment of one of her commitments can be defended. Secondly, no justified position in RE was reached. With respect to RE as a method, the main results from this application are: There is at least one conception of RE that is sufficiently specified to be applicable; the RE criteria put real constraints on the process of justification; and an explicit application of RE has benefits in terms of clarity while at the same time providing guidance for how the justificatory process could be continued. (shrink)

Gunnar Olsson's tale follows an explorer from the oldest creation epics extant to the power struggles of today, an attempt to codify the taken-for-granted, a struggle with the invisible powers that make us so obedient and so predictable.

The paper presents a description of the foundations of Ludvik Bartelj’s philosophy. Bartelj, born in 1913, lives and writes philosophy and theology in Slovenia. He is a close follower of his teacher’s, France Weber/veber, ‘‘Gegenstandsphilosophie’’ [‘‘object-philosophy’’= OP]. He develops OP in some respects and also in some areas missing in Veber but even these innovations take as their point of departure Veberian ‘‘Gegenstandsphilosophie.’’ For Bartelj OP theory is the fundamental philosophic discipline and, finally, will embrace all real ‘‘objects.’’ OP itself (...) is grounded in the knowledge that objects receive their contents from Primeval Reality [Urwirklichkeit; Prastvarnost], i.e. from God. Bartelj also exploits the scholastic tradition and he intends to complement one of the two positions by means of the other. He divides the faculty of cognition into four species: Sense perception, ‘‘profound understanding’’ [Tiefenverstand; globinski razum], ‘‘peripheral understanding,’’ and feelings. Profound and peripheral understanding are intertwined indissolubly: Whereas profound understanding approaches objects in a non-conceptual way, peripheral understanding has the task to determine conceptually profound understanding’s cognition(s). By means of profound understanding the subject of cognition as well as its experiences are epistemically grasped. God, too, is the object of profound understanding, and knowledge of God directly emerges from the real empirical world. Profound understanding discovers that such ‘‘realities’’ are, according to their very nature, dependent on something else, i.e. their content(s) come(s) from a being independent by nature, which Bartelj calls ‘‘Primeval Reality’’ [Prastvarnost] or ‘‘God.’’. (shrink)

The paper presents a description of the foundations of Ludvik Barteljs philosophy. Bartelj, born in 1913, lives and writes philosophy and theology in Slovenia. He is a close follower of his teachers, France Weber/Veber, Gegenstandsphilosophie [object-philosophy= OP]. He develops OP in some respects and also in some areas missing in Veber but even these innovations take as their point of departure Veberian Gegenstandsphilosophie. For Bartelj OP theory is the fundamental philosophic discipline and, finally, will embrace all real objects. OP itself (...) is grounded in the knowledge that objects receive their contents from Primeval Reality [Urwirklichkeit; Prastvarnost], i.e. from God. Bartelj also exploits the scholastic tradition and he intends to complement one of the two positions by means of the other. He divides the faculty of cognition into four species: Sense perception, profound understanding [Tiefenverstand; globinski razum], peripheral understanding, and feelings. Profound and peripheral understanding are intertwined indissolubly: Whereas profound understanding approaches objects in a non-conceptual way, peripheral understanding has the task to determine conceptually profound understandings cognition(s). By means of profound understanding the subject of cognition as well as its experiences are epistemically grasped. God, too, is the object of profound understanding, and knowledge of God directly emerges from the real empirical world. Profound understanding discovers that such realities are, according to their very nature, dependent on something else, i.e. their content(s) come(s) from a being independent by nature, which Bartelj calls Primeval Reality [Prastvarnost] or God. (shrink)

The paper presents a description of the foundations of Ludvik Bartelj's philosophy. Bartelj, born in 1913, lives and writes philosophy and theology in Slovenia. He is a close follower of his teacher's, France Weber/Veber, "Gegenstandsphilosophie" ["object-philosophy" = OP]. He develops OP in some respects and also in some areas missing in Veber but even these innovations take as their point of departure Veberian "Gegenstandsphilosophie." For Bartelj OP theory is the fundamental philosophic discipline and, finally, will embrace all real "objects." OP (...) itself is grounded in the knowledge that objects receive their contents from Primeval Reality [Urwirklichkeit; Prastvarnost], i.e. from God. Bartelj also exploits the scholastic tradition and he intends to complement one of the two positions by means of the other. He divides the faculty of cognition into four species: Sense perception, "profound understanding" [Tiefenverstand; globinski razum], "peripheral understanding," and feelings. Profound and peripheral understanding are intertwined indissolubly: Whereas profound understanding approaches objects in a non-conceptual way, peripheral understanding has the task to determine conceptually profound understanding's cognition. By means of profound understanding the subject of cognition as well as its experiences are epistemically grasped. God, too, is the object of profound understanding, and knowledge of God directly emerges from the real empirical world. Profound understanding discovers that such "realities" are, according to their very nature, dependent on something else, i.e. their content come from a being independent by nature, which Bartelj calls "Primeval Reality" [Prastvarnost] or "God". (shrink)

This essay examines Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience in Being and Time. From a phenomenological perspective, the call of conscience needs to be analysed with respect to who is calling, who is being called, what message is conveyed, and how the message is conveyed. Heidegger’s results are rather surprising to our common understanding and impose various challenges on his interpreters. In my article, I return to Heidegger’s text in order to question some persuasions and assumptions of the common readings. The call (...) comes from me, yet in such a way that it overcomes me. The call does not come from a different being in the world, and the call of conscience should thus not be conflated with the ‘voice of the friend’ mentioned in an earlier section of Being and Time. Rather, we need to take the call seriously as alien and yet my own, giving me to understand that I am guilty before and outside of any economy of deeds. Because the call of conscience belongs to such a fundamental level, Heidegger’s response concerning the ‘how’ of the call also becomes understandable. The call is unambiguous, even though we always give ambiguous interpretations of it. (shrink)

According to Lévinas, art is an ambiguous phenomenon. He shares this conviction with Plato and bases it on Platonic arguments. Lévinas often refers to the Platonic critique of writing in the dialogue Phaedrus and employs it to support the thesis that all works, especially all artworks, are subject to misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Art is lacking the immediacy of the ethical encounter with the Other, and it allows us to evade reality. In this article, I will turn to the ambiguity of (...) art and show that the diagnosis of an ambiguity is convincing, yet might not necessarily yield a rejection of art. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim zählt zu den Klassikern der Soziologie. Der Band greift erstmals unbekannte Rezeptionslinien Durkheims auf und zeigt ihn so in all seiner Komplexität und Aktualität: als Vorreiter einer transdisziplinären Sozialwissenschaft, als scharfsinnigen Theoretiker, als Denker des Materiellen und des Symbolischen. Neben ihm kommen auch seine Kollegen, Erben und zeitgenössischen Kritiker in den Blick. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Durkheims Werk nicht nur die Soziologie prägte, sondern auch der Ethnologie und der Philosophie grundlegende Impulse gab. Mit Beiträgen von Stéphane Baciocchi, Stefan (...) Beck, Tanja Bogusz, Heike Delitz, Emmanuel Désveaux, Jean-Louis Fabiani, Joachim Fischer, Marcel Fournier, Bruno Karsenti, Frédéric Keck, Wiebke Keim, Steven Lukes, Stephan Moebius, Lothar Peter, Devyani Prabhat, Anne W. Rawls, Thomas Scheffer, Michael Schillmeier, Robert Seyfert, Susan Stedman Jones und Jean Terrier. (shrink)

Despite a strong sensitization to the corruption problem and a large body of interdisciplinary research, scientists have only rarely investigated which motivational, volitional, emotional, and cognitive components make decision makers in companies act corruptly. Thus, we examined how their interrelation leads to corruption by proposing an action model. We tested the model using a business simulation game with students as participants. Results of the PLS structural equation modeling showed that both an attitude and subjective norm favoring corruption led to a (...) desire to act corruptly. Given high perceived behavioral control, this desire was transformed into an intention that finally resulted in corrupt action. Components related to general private and professional goals did not allow for any prediction. Based on these results, we discuss preventative measures and methods for combating intra- and inter-organizational corruption. (shrink)

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not (...) forthcoming. (shrink)

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not (...) forthcoming. (shrink)

Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry (...) and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter. (shrink)

The literature states that both situational and individual factors contribute to corrupt behavior. This study investigates the influence of rarely empirically investigated situational factors - the size of the bribe, time pressure, and the degree of abstractness of the business code - on the Model of Corrupt Action that describes the subjective decision making process of corrupt actors. To test the effects, I used an experimental simulation design. Only few effects were found. Thus, my results show a certain robustness of (...) corrupt behavior against the examined situational influences. Based on these results, I discuss implications for the prevention of corruption in organizations. (shrink)

The paper deals mainly with two problems in the epistemology of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. One concerns his account of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. I argue that Ramsey failed to make room for the social aspect of knowledge and, furthermore, that he did not separate the fallibility of our view from its corrigibility. My positive proposal is to combine social reliabilism and corrigibilism with a rejection of fallibilism.